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"termination." The court explained that in insurance law, cancellation referred to a termination
of a policy prior to its expiration.
In contrast, termination referred to
the expiration of the policy due to
lapse of the policy period. Since
Watts's policy terminated due to
the lapse of the policy period, the
court determined that notice under
the loss payable clause was not
required.
Although Farm and City offered
to renew Watts's policy, the court
explained that the offer did not
affect its decision. By its terms, the
policy automatically terminated
upon Watts's failure to pay the
renewal premium. Indeed, the termination signaled a rejection of the
offer.
Finally, the supreme court rejected First National's public policy argument that an insurer had an
inherent duty to give notice of the
expiration to a loss payee. The
court recognized that no known
authority required an insurance
company to continue to contract
with an insured after the policy
expired. Also, the court emphasized that because First National
had a copy of the declaration page,
it was fully aware of the expiration
date. The court concluded that in
the absence of an insurance policy
or statutory provision stating otherwise, an insurer had no duty to
notify a lienholder of a policyholder's failure to renew or of the
expiration of the policy period.
The court reversed and remanded the case, directing that judgment be entered in favor of Farm
and City.
Elizabeth A. Barnes

Iowa Supreme Court
Denied Right of First
Refusal To Agricultural
Property Mortgagors
In Cole v. First Bank of Greene,
463 N.W.2d 59 (Iowa 1990), the
Iowa Supreme Court held that a
bank was not required to offer the
prior owners of foreclosed agricultural property the opportunity to
repurchase the property. In addition, the court held that the prior
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owners failed to establish the existence of an oral contract with the
bank which would have permitted
the prior owners to purchase a
portion of the foreclosed property
at a reduced price.

the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale.
On all three issues, the Iowa
district court decided in favor of
First Bank. The Coles appealed.
Supreme Court's Decision

Background

Right to Fair Market Valuation of
Homestead
On appeal, the Coles argued that
the district court erred in refusing
to determine the fair market value
of their homestead according to §
654.16. Iowa Code § 654.16
(1987). In 1986, the Iowa Legislature adopted § 654.16 which provided that a mortgagor could designate a portion of the foreclosed
land as a homestead. The statute
also stated that a court would
determine the fair market value of
the homestead, in the event it was
sold with nonhomestead property;
the mortgagor was permitted to
redeem the homestead separately
within two years of the foreclosure
sale. In 1987, the Iowa Legislature
amended § 654.16, revising the
valuation procedures for agricultural homesteads subject to redemption.
The court rejected the Coles'
argument. The court noted that the
Coles had conceded in their posttrial brief that § 654.16 did not
apply to them due to its enactment
date. In this case, the sheriff's sale
took place prior to the effective
date of the 1987 revisions to §
654.16. The court held that
through their earlier concession
regarding § 654.16, the Coles
waived their right to raise the issue
on appeal.

Dean and Marilyn Cole (the
"Coles") borrowed money from
the First Bank of Greene ("First
Bank") and used their eighty-three
acre farm as collateral. When the
Coles failed to repay the loans,
First Bank obtained a decree of
foreclosure on the Coles' farm in
November 1986. Pursuant to an
order by the district court, the
county sheriff placed a levy on the
property. In December 1986, the
Coles filed a designation of homestead, which exempted their residence and up to forty acres of their
property from creditors' liens.
In January 1987, First Bank bid
$80,000 for the property at a sheriff's sale. First Bank received a
certificate of sheriff's sale which
entitled it to receive within one
year either the balance of the debt
owed by the Coles or the title to
their farm. First Bank immediately
assigned the certificate to Leon D.
Steere and C. Jolene Steere (the
"Steeres") for $70,000; First Bank
did not first offer the Coles the
opportunity to repurchase the
property on the same terms.
Seven months later, the Coles
filed an application in the foreclosure action, asking the court to
determine the fair market value of
the homestead property. The court
did not act on this application.
The Coles filed suit in 1988
against First Bank and the Steeres.
First, the Coles claimed that the
district court's failure to determine
the fair market value of the homestead in the foreclosure action denied them their right to redeem
their property. Iowa Code § 654.16
(1987). Second, the Coles alleged
that First Bank denied them their
right of first refusal by failing to
offer them the sheriff's certificate
at the same price that the Steeres
paid. Iowa Code § 524.910(2)
(1 987). Finally, the Coles contended that First Bank breached an oral
agreement it had made in which it
agreed to resell the Coles six acres
of their property if First Bank was

Right of First Refusal
Second, the Coles asserted that
under § 524.910(2), Iowa Code §
524.910(2) (1987), First Bank was
required first to offer the foreclosed property to them on the
same terms as proposed to the
Steeres. Section 524.910(2) required a state bank to dispose of
real property purchased in a foreclosure sale within five years after
the title vested in the bank. The
statute also provided that if the
real property was agricultural land,
prior to selling the land to another
person, the bank must offer the
prior owner the opportunity to
(continued on page 108)
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(continued from page 107)

repurchase the agricultural land on
the same terms that the bank seeks
to dispose of the land.
The Coles contended that First
Bank's receipt of the sheriff's certificate constituted a purchase of
agricultural land. Therefore, the
Coles argued that First Bank was
required first to offer the certificate to them before it offered the
certificate to the Steeres, as First
Bank held the agricultural land in
accordance with § 524.910(2).
The Iowa Supreme Court rejected the Coles' argument. The court
distinguished between holding title
to real estate and holding a lien on
real estate. The court found that
the sheriff's certificate only created
a lien and was an interest in personal rather than real property. In
addition, the court noted that the
statute applied only to the sale or
disposition of land. Since First
Bank merely assigned the sheriff's
certificate to the Steeres, the court
found that a sale of land had not
occurred. The court held that the
assignment did not trigger the right
of first refusal contained within the
statute.
In addition, the court found that
§ 524.910(2) permitted a bank to
dispose of real property only after
the bank had vested title to the
property. The court noted that only
after a mortgagor's redemption period expired would title vest in the
holder of a sheriff's certificate of
sale. In this case, the redemption
period had not expired prior to
First Bank's assignment of the
sheriff's certificate. Because the
sheriff's certificate did not vest
title in First Bank, the court held
that the right of first refusal contained within the statute did not
apply.
The court speculated that the
legislature probably intended for
the right to first refusal to apply in
a case such as this since the statute
was intended to grant relief to
financially troubled farmers. However, the court refused to legislate,
confirming the district court's interpretation of § 524.910(2).
No Oral Contract Existed
Lastly, the Coles alleged that
108

First Bank orally agreed to sell the
Coles a portion of the foreclosed
property for a reduced price in the
event First Bank was the highest
bidder in the foreclosure sale. The
court adopted the district court's
factual findings. The court found
that the Coles' problems with their
line of credit began in December
1985. At that time, First Bank gave
the Coles until April 1986 to pay
their debts in full. In October 1986,
a First Bank official met with the
Coles and their sons in an effort to
resolve the nonpayment of their
loans and avoid future litigation;
the official told them that if they
would deed the property to First
Bank, First Bank would sell them
six acres for $10,000 and would
finance the sale. However, First
Bank and the Coles did not discuss
the particular terms of the deal,
and the Coles did not act upon this
offer. The court agreed with the
district court's characterization of
the conversation as preliminary
negotiations instead of an agreement.
The court found further evidence that supported First Bank's
claim. A letter written to the Coles
by their attorney stated that First
Bank would be more willing to
consider a settlement if one could
be obtained without litigation.
This supported the bank's assertion that the offer was made to
avoid litigation expenses. Finally,
the court cited the Coles' inaction
in other dealings with First Bank as
evidence that the Coles took no
action on the bank's offer and that
no oral agreement existed. The
court held that the Coles failed to
meet their burden of proof to show
by clear and convincing evidence
that a contract existed.
Jonathan Barrish

New York Court Upholds
Rent Control
Regulations Which
Broaden the Definition
of Family to Include
Adult Lifetime Partners
In Rent Stabilization Association
of New York v. Higgins, 562

N.Y.S.2d 962 (A.D. 1 Dept. 1990),
the Supreme Court of New York,
Appellate Division, reversed a lower court decision enjoining the
implementation of amendments to
New York City rent control regulations. The new regulations broaden
the definition of 'family' and increase the availability of rent control benefits.
Background
The New York State Court of
Appeals, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 543 N.E.2d 49
(1989), recently held that the term
"family," as used in the New York
City rent control regulations, 9
NYCRR § 2204.6(d), Rent Control
Law, included "two adult lifetime
partners whose relationship is long
term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment
and interdependence." 74 N.Y.2d
at 211. In late 1989, the State
Division of Housing and Community Renewal ("DHCR") began the
process of amending its rent control and stabilization regulations
by promulgating an emergency rule
in accord with the Braschi definition of family. The emergency rule
broadened the definition of family
members entitled to rental succession rights.
The prior rent stabilization regulations provided for succession in
two circumstances: first, where the
family member had resided with
the named tenant from the beginning of the tenancy and the named
tenant vacated the premises, 9
NYCRR § 2523.5[b][1] (1987),
and second, where the family
member had resided with the
named tenant for at least two years
immediately prior to the death of
the named tenant. 9 NYCRR §
2523.5[b][2] (1987). The emergency rule promulgated by the DHCR
abolished the distinction between
the named tenant's death or mere
departure. Upon the named tenant's abandonment of the premises, a family member could succeed
to the rights of the tenant, after
residing with the tenant from the
start of the lease or for at least two
years. In addition, the emergency
rule listed eight specific factors to
be considered in determining
whether the requisite emotional
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